PERSPECTIVAL SKEPTICAL THEISM
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge

Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an
alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat
that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard
for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from
suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can
be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not
subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.

The strongest versions of the argument from suffering have been primarily cast in an evidential form.1 That is, they have been crafted in such
a way as to hinge on the mere weighing of evidence. Although this might
appear innocuous at first glance,2 it is not as innocent as it seems. For the
reasonability of believing a proposition (e.g., gratuitous suffering exists)
plausibly depends on more than merely evidential matters. It also depends
importantly on non-evidential, but still epistemic, factors that can vary
significantly from agent to agent. Such factors include, for instance, an
agent’s degree of epistemic self-trust or the degree of risk they are willing
to take on in pursuit of the truth and avoidance of error.
This focus on merely evidential considerations has trickled down to the
epistemic assumptions involved in responses to the argument from suffering
as well. And nowhere is this more apparent than in the models of skeptical
theism found in current literature. Given that skeptical theism aims to undermine the reasonability of believing that there are gratuitous evils, and
given further that one’s reasonability in believing something depends on
more than merely evidential considerations, one would expect skeptical
theism to (sometimes) take on more than a merely evidentialist3 form.
1
See, for instance, Rowe, “The Evidential Argument from Evil” and Draper and Dougherty,
“Explanation and the Problem of Evil.”

After all, what’s not to like about arguing something by citing evidence?

2

I use “evidentialist” broadly here to include those who think that fit with evidence is
at least a necessary condition of rational/justified belief. By “merely evidentialist,” then, I
refer to anyone who thinks non-evidential factors are irrelevant considerations in the par3
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In a previous article4 I provided the beginnings of a framework for
developing just such a version of skeptical theism by suggesting that
skeptical theism might be wedded to a perspectivalist account of epistemic
rationality. However, this suggestion was made without much by way of
further elaboration concerning what such a view might look like in full. It
is the purpose of this essay to remove this lacuna by constructing a more
robust account of a new perspectival skeptical theism, as well as to highlight
the significant contributions such a view makes to the current literature on
the argument from suffering.
I begin in § 1 by reintroducing the basic structure of the argument from
suffering and skeptical theism as a response to it. Upon completing this, I
briefly turn in § 2 to a distinction between two different types of epistemic
undercutting defeaters, namely, evidential defeaters and closure-of-inquiry
defeaters; the elaboration of this distinction is necessary for appreciating
perspectival skeptical theism’s distinctiveness as a version of skeptical
theism. Then in § 3 I turn to a case from the cognitive psychology literature
involving empirical studies concerning the selection of applicants for admission to medical school. This case is particularly useful for our purposes
because it clearly illustrates various ways in which a putative undercutting
defeater—i.e., of either the evidential or closure-of-inquiry sort—might
be rationally resolved by agents with different epistemic starting points.
More specifically, I argue that we can uncover at least six different rational
responses to an epistemic defeater provided by the claims of the empirical
studies under question. Next, in § 4 we return once more to skeptical theism
where I apply what we have learned from the previous two sections. What
we again see is that for any agent entertaining the theses characteristic of
skeptical theism, there are at least six different rational ways of resolving
the putative defeaters such theses present. Finally, in § 5 I reflect on various
advantages perspectival skeptical theism possesses over alternative forms
of skeptical theism and conclude that it should play a significant part in
conversations about the argument from suffering moving forward. Let us
begin, then, with an overview of the argument from suffering.
1. The Argument from Suffering and Skeptical Theism
The best version of the argument from suffering of which I am aware
proceeds in two parts, the first of which can be stated in the following
deductive fashion5:
ticular case of the argument from suffering, such that in the context of that discussion, fit
with evidence is necessary and sufficient for believing in the existence of gratuitous suffering.
See Dougherty and Tweedt (“Religious Epistemology,” 552) where they discuss my use of
“evidentialist” under the label of “Epistemic Evidentialism.” For a nice discussion of the
various disputes amongst evidentialists concerning how best to construe their view, see the
introduction to Dougherty, Evidentialism and Its Discontents.
4
Rutledge, “Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry
Defeat.”
5
There are other arguments from suffering to which skeptical theism (and variants of
it) may not be straightforwardly relevant. The traditional logical argument does not make
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1. If God exists, then there are no instances of gratuitous suffering.
2. There are instances of gratuitous suffering.
Therefore,
3. God does not exist.
Now, someone might attack premise 1 for a variety of reasons,6 but this
is neither the most common response nor the response most relevant to
our current concerns. Instead, premise 2 bears the brunt of the critical responses historically-speaking since many theists find it difficult at best to
believe that anyone could reasonably believe premise 2.
In support of the second premise, however, those advancing this argument from suffering might appeal to a principle of commonsense
epistemology, such as:
Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then S is prima facie
justified in believing p.7
On the assumption that such a principle is true or rationally endorsed
by someone advancing the argument from suffering detailed above, one
could appeal to a combination of this epistemic principle and a particular
seeming of some bit of suffering as gratuitous to arrive at a justified belief
that there are instances of gratuitous suffering. And so long as there are
no defeaters that prevent the immediate prima facie justified belief from
becoming ultima facie justified, it will be reasonable for that person to affirm it.
It is at this point that skeptical theism becomes relevant, for skeptical
theism is fundamentally at least an endorsement of the claim that there is
a putative epistemic defeater for those who might otherwise reasonably
believe premise 2 of the argument from suffering. That defeater can be
stated as follows:
Skeptical Theism (ST): Human agents simply are not in a position to determine how likely or unlikely it is that a given instance of apparently
gratuitous evil is actually gratuitous.
To put it simply, skeptical theists affirm both ST and that someone who
reasonably believes ST cannot reasonably endorse premise 2 of the evidential argument from suffering. The reason for this is that ST undercuts
the connection between the evidence one possesses of gratuitous sufuse of the concept of gratuitous evil, but rather, evil simpliciter, and since skeptical theism is
not relevant to non-gratuitous forms of evil, it is irrelevant as a response to the logical argument (cf. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence”). Plausibly, the Humean arguments developed by
Draper are likewise immune to skeptical theist responses (though not obviously). For such
an argument, see Draper and Dougherty, “Explanation and the Problem of Evil.”
See, for instance, the approach taken in van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil.

6

See Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. This principle is also quoted in Rutledge,
“Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry Defeat,” 18.
7
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fering (i.e., one’s seemings) and what that evidence had been previously
thought to support. Or at least, this follows provided that one’s seeming-states as of gratuitous suffering are the only source of evidence for
premise 2.
From this brief overview of the argument from suffering, however,
it is clear that a completed version of skeptical theism requires further
elaboration. For the idea of undercutting the connection between one’s evidence and what it supports can be spelled out in a number of different
ways. And since the goal of this paper is to construct a version of skeptical
theism that relies on a perspectivalist theory of epistemic rationality, let
us turn to a brief formal discussion of the two fundamental types of epistemic undercutting defeaters involved in such a view.
2. On Evidential and Closure-of-Inquiry Undercutting Defeaters
Undercutting defeaters come in at least two varieties, the first and more
familiar of which are evidential defeaters. To understand the nature of
evidential defeat, let e be one’s evidence concerning p whenever the probability of p given e is greater than the probability of p on one’s background
evidence alone (i.e., Pr [ p|e] > Pr [ p]). Then we can say that dFull is a full
defeater of the evidential support relation8 whenever the probability of
p given e & dFull is equal to the probability of p alone (i.e., Pr [ p|e & dFull]
= Pr [ p]). We can say that dPartial is a partial evidential support relation defeater whenever the probability of p given e & dPartial is greater than the
probability of p alone but less than the probability of p given e—that is,
the following both hold (on the assumption that e is evidence as construed
above):
i. Pr [ p|e & dPartial] < Pr [ p|e]
ii. Pr [p|e & dPartial] > Pr [ p]9
The other sort of defeater sometimes introduced during discussions
of perspectivalist forms of epistemic rationality is a closure-of-inquiry defeater, of which one would say the following:

8
Let the “evidential support relation” simply name the relation that holds between e and
p. That is, let it name the is-evidence-for relation. Notice that in the case of dPartial, e and p
continue to instantiate the is-evidence-for relation, but the degree of evidential strength is
diminished by the defeater. As I conceive of this, there is but one epistemic support relation
that admits of degrees in the same way that a single relation of love might admit of degrees.
Moreover, I restrict the discussion above to merely undercutting defeaters and leave the
question of rebutting defeaters to one side. Rebutting defeaters of the evidential relation
between e and p reduce the strength of the support relation by being evidence for ¬ p. However, undercutters undermine the relation between e and p without being evidence for the
negation of p. See Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge and Pollock and Gillies, “Belief
Revision and Epistemology.” Despite this, it is possible for a defeater to serve as both an
undercutting defeater as well as a rebutting defeater at the same time. Thanks for an anonymous referee for bringing the importance of including these points to my attention.
9
Rutledge, “Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry
Defeat,” 22.
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Such defeaters . . . do not affect the evidential support relation at all qua
closure of inquiry defeater. Rather, they defeat the reasonability of believing
some target proposition on the basis of one’s evidence, no matter how strong
or compelling the evidence.10

Notice that on this account, closure-of-inquiry defeaters do not target
the evidential support relation. Rather, they undermine reasonable belief
in a proposition, even if the evidence is very compelling. In other words,
we can say that whenever dCoI is merely a closure-of-inquiry defeater, the
following will be true:
iii. Pr [ p|e & dCoI] = Pr [ p|e], and
iv. Even if Pr [ p|e] ≈ 1, p cannot be reasonably believed.
Before moving onto the question of why closure-of-inquiry defeaters
undermine reasonable belief, as indicated in (iv) above, let me be explicit
that one and the same proposition might give someone both a closure-of-inquiry defeater and an evidential defeater of some sort. In such a
case, what is fundamental to the presence of a closure-of-inquiry defeater
is that p cannot be reasonably believed on the basis of the evidence for
p, whether or not the degree of evidential support remains unchanged.11
Thus, (iii) above only holds for closure-of-inquiry defeaters that arise from
a proposition that does not also give the agent in question an evidential
defeater. When a proposition does give one an evidential defeater, then
the truth or falsity of (iv) determines whether the agent under question
also has a closure-of-inquiry defeater.
Now that we have distinguished these two types of defeaters, it is worth
pressing further the question of why reasonable belief is undermined by
closure-of-inquiry defeaters. There are at least two significant contexts
worth attending to for our purposes from which closure-of-inquiry defeat
might emerge: scenarios in which (i) further evidence gathering activities

10
Rutledge, “Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry
Defeat,” 24. The name “closure-of-inquiry defeater” might mislead someone into thinking
that such defeaters themselves close off inquiry. This is mistaken, for such defeaters make
closure of inquiry no longer reasonable. In other words, their presence opens up (or reopens)
inquiry rather than closing it off. Thanks for an anonymous referee who suggested the need
for clarification.
11
Consider a case where one’s evidence for p is undermined sufficiently to bring the degree of evidential support between e and p to a point at which closure of inquiry is also
defeated. In this case, someone might wonder why we need to posit any defeater in addition
to the evidential one since, presumably, the reason one can no longer close off inquiry is
due to the evidential support falling below some threshold for reasonable belief. I have two
responses to this. First, there are cases in which we have closure-of-inquiry defeaters without
any evidential defeat, and so, it seems they cannot be merely reduced to each other. Second,
if someone were unconvinced by the cases, then they likely have a view denying dualism
about the epistemology of belief and the epistemology of degrees of belief. That is, they
likely take either belief or degrees of belief to be fundamental in epistemology. See Jackson,
“Belief and Credence,” where she discusses how belief-first, credence-first, and dualist positions make a significant difference to various areas of contemporary epistemology.
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seem likely to make a significant difference to what one’s evidence supports or (ii) one’s epistemic self-trust is called into question.12
Concerning the latter sort of closure-of-inquiry defeat that is most relevant for our purposes, it is important to note the following: sometimes
epistemic defeaters do not undermine the quality of one’s evidence, as
normally happens in cases involving evidential undercutting defeat.
Rather, often epistemic defeaters target our ability to assess that evidence,
independently of whether or not it is of good quality. When our ability to
assess evidence is targeted, rather than the quality of the evidence we have,
then we find ourselves (potentially) in the possession of a closure-of-inquiry defeater.13
To understand better how these different considerations might play
out, we turn to an actual case involving evidential and closure-of-inquiry
defeaters and consider how such defeaters might interact for reasonable
individuals confronted by them. This case is especially helpful for thinking
practically about how the formal considerations above might look when
put in a concrete context involving someone thinking seriously about
what to do or think in light of the threat of an undercutting defeater. Once
we have applied the evidential and closure-of-inquiry defeater distinction
in this first case, we then turn to see how it might be similarly applied to
the case of skeptical theism.
3. Interviewing Candidates for Medical School: Undermining the
Quality of Evidence and the Reliable Assessment of Evidence
In recent years the relevance of certain sorts of heuristics and biases to a
theory of rationality has attracted the attention of epistemologists.14 While
there are a number of different cases that we could consider, the following
scenario involving the interviewing of medical school candidates15 is especially illuminating:

12
A discerning referee has drawn my attention to a combination of a particular theory of
evidence and a theory of evidential support that would prevent closure-of-inquiry defeaters
from being non-evidential, even if they are not clearly the same thing as a typical run-of-themill undercutter. Suppose that one takes all evidence to be non-factive mental states (e.g.,
beliefs), a view which, following McCain, Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification, ch. 2, we
call “psychologism.” Then suppose we understand evidential support in terms of something
akin to proper function such that belief A supports B to a degree within the interval < x, y > if
were S to believe A then S would believe B to a degree within the interval < x, y > (see Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 167–168 for a way of defining the normative component
of conditional epistemic probability along the lines I give here for epistemic support). On
this combination of views, closure-of-inquiry defeat reduces to a form of evidential defeat.
In this paper I presuppose a propositional account of the ontology of evidence, and on such
a view, no such reduction occurs. See Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits and Kvanvig,
“Propositionalism and McCain’s Evidentialism” for defenses of the position I assume here.
13
More on closure-of-inquiry defeaters can be found in Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection,
115–116 and Kvanvig, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.”
14

Cf. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow for examples of such phenomena.

15

See Dawes, House of Cards for a discussion of these and other similar studies.
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In a wide range of studies, short personal interviews, typically one hour,
have been proven unhelpful in improving the accuracy of predictions about
the future accomplishments or behavior of the interviewees. One of the
studies involves medical school admission committees that conducted personal interviews of applicants to supplement statistical and other impersonally gathered data about the applicants (MCAT scores, grade point average,
class rank, quality of undergraduate institution, etc.). The task for the committees was to predict future success in medical school as measured by the
grades the students would receive. . . . The conclusion of these studies is that
personal interviews do not improve predictions of future accomplishments
or behavior. They did not help the interviewers identify who would become
successful in medical school (as measured by grades). . . . Indeed, far from
improving predictive performance, the interviews actually worsened the accuracy of the predictions made.16

The findings of these studies is not favorable for the continued practice of interviewing potential medical school candidates. For clearly these
interviews, when included in the assessment of an applicant, have in the
past inhibited medical schools from achieving their goal of selecting the
candidates who would be most successful.17 Now, suppose that you were
required by your superior to conduct one-hour interviews for potential
medical school students and that you learned of the studies described
above only after conducting the interviews. Despite this, your supervisor
has granted you permission to decide how to factor your intuitions concerning each candidate’s potential into your overall assessment of them.18
It is helpful when thinking about a noetic state undergoing this progression to represent it as constituted by three basic logical steps: (i) Defeater
Admission, (ii) Determination of the Defeater-Type, and (iii) Defeater Resolution. We consider these three steps in logical sequence.
First, consider the two different defeaters to which the empirical studies
concerning personal medical school interviews might give rise. In light of
those studies, one might entertain either the proposition that the evidence
one gains through personal interviews is of a bad quality or the proposition that
one’s ability to gather and assess evidence gained through personal interviews is
unreliable.19 Notice that both of these propositions would be undercutting
16

Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others, 55–56.

The actual goal of medical schools is, hopefully, much more complicated than what I’ve
stated here. However, these complications are irrelevant to the example as I am employing
it, so I ignore them throughout.
17

18
Caveat: someone might think that significant self-monitoring might allow an interviewer to reasonably continue to count her intuitions concerning candidates as evidence of
future success. Foley (Intellectual Trust, 63–76) offers some helpful reflections on why this is
unlikely. However, we can avoid a digression regarding the impossibility of self-monitoring
by simply stipulating it in this case.
19
Notice that here I have introduced a case where the two propositions that serve as undercutting defeaters specify whether the difficulties with the evidence are in the evidence or
in the assessment of the evidence. The proposition in question, however, may not be so specific. That higher-order proposition might, for instance, simply state that something about
one’s first-order evidence is a problem (e.g., that there is a problem with using the evidence
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defeaters if believed by an interviewer, but what is undermined by the two
propositions is different. In the former case, the evidence is undermined because it is identified as plausibly misleading. In the latter case, one’s ability
to gather and evaluate evidence is undermined, not the evidence itself.20 In
other words, one is faced with either a putative evidential defeater or a
putative closure-of-inquiry defeater (or perhaps even both).
The point of Defeater Admission comes as a result of the platitude that
we shouldn’t believe everything we hear, and in particular, not every putative defeater one entertains need be believed. Whether or not I believe the
propositional defeater under question depends on what else I believe, my
epistemic risk profile,21 my degree of epistemic self-trust,22 what I make
of the evidence I have received, and so on. To apply this to our current
scenario concerning medical school candidate interviews, suppose that I
have a justified belief that any empirical studies concerning my reliability
in assessing the evidence gathered by means of personal interviews (or the
quality of the evidence itself) are complete hogwash.23 We might call such
a belief, following Plantinga,24 a “defeater-deflector.” Maintaining such a
belief would, if I am consistent, preclude my also believing the putative
defeaters of the empirical studies. Thus, before I even begin to consider
the defeating potential of any putative defeater, that defeater must first
avoid deflection by relevant beliefs I already possess.25
Let us suppose for the sake of continuing with this thought experiment
that at least one of the putative defeaters has avoided deflection. Thus, the
first logical step in the process of defeat has concluded and we begin the
second step; namely, Determination of the Defeater-Type. At the beginning
one has for believing the target proposition) without specifying whether the problem is one
where the evidence is misleading or one’s ability to assess it is somehow compromised. In
cases where an insufficiently specific proposition is in play, then the same proposition could
give someone both an evidential defeater and a closure-of-inquiry defeater.
20
And of course, after reflecting on these empirical studies we might come to think that
both of these defeaters are true, in which case, both our reliability in gathering and assessing
evidence and the evidence itself will be undermined.
21
See, for instance, Riggs, “Balancing Our Epistemic Goals”; Riggs, “Epistemic Risk and
Relativism”; and Kvanvig, Rationality and Reflection, chapter 5.
22
For the best work on the notion and import of epistemic self-trust, see Foley, Intellectual
Trust and Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority.
23
Someone might worry about ever justifying such a belief, but since we’re dealing with
a stipulated example, let us suppose that God has infallibly communicated this proposition
to me.
24
Plantinga, “Reply to Beilby’s Cohorts,” 223–225 and further discussion of defeater-deflectors in Moon, “Debunking Morality,” 210–212. The difference between a defeater-defeater
and defeater-deflector is this: in the former case, there is a belief that has functioned as a
defeater which is itself the object of defeat by some new belief. In the latter, defeater-deflector
case, the proposition doing the deflecting prevents a defeater from arising in the first place.
25
It is worth noting that even if I do have what could be a defeater-deflector, I might
trust that deflector-belief less than I trust the putative defeater (perhaps due to the source of
the defeater). Thus, the presence of beliefs that are structurally defeater-deflectors does not
prevent defeat in every case. The point, however, is that sometimes such beliefs do prevent
defeater admission, and sometimes they do so in accordance with reflective rationality.
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of this second step, then, we are in a position to determine whether the
defeater or defeaters which we have admitted into our noetic system
are either evidential defeaters (i.e., one which is either partial or full) or
closure-of-inquiry defeaters. The way in which this step proceeds, however, is fairly complicated. In order to bring these complications to the
surface, in what follows we survey the various combinations of defeater-types along with their correlative Defeater-Resolutions (i.e., step 3).
We have already seen in our discussion of defeater-deflectors that
other beliefs are relevant to the admission of a defeater into our noetic
system. At this second step, in which we sort out the kind of defeater with
which we are dealing, other epistemic factors again become relevant to
what might happen. Let us consider five different ways in which rational
reflection might play out for the medical school interviews case during
this sorting phase.26 That is, let us consider what kind of reflection might
lead an agent to admit either a closure-of-inquiry defeater, an evidential
defeater, or both.
Recall that in our thought experiment, you have already interviewed
potential medical school candidates, and thus, you have evidence concerning who the best candidate is based on those interviews as its source.
Moreover, prior to considering the implications of these empirical studies,
let us stipulate that you had determined that Polly was probably the best
medical school candidate. And now, when you hear these studies, you
reason as follows:
Wow, it seems like these studies could call into question either the
status of the evidence I have gathered from the interviews or my ability
to assess that evidence (or both). However, when I reflect on this more
carefully, I’m not sure why anyone would think that my evidence is
problematic. After all, I simply gathered more information about each
candidate in a particular setting. So my evidence doesn’t seem to be
undermined. Despite this, given that I and all other members of my
kind are highly fallible in tracking what this evidence actually connects
to, perhaps I should keep my inquiry open until I can either gather more
evidence that sufficiently confirms what I already take my current evidence to imply or find a further reason to disregard the findings of
these studies that are undermining the trust I have in myself to assess
the evidence at hand.
This line of reasoning reflects the noetic system of a person dealing
with a closure-of-inquiry defeater, for they do not change their assessment
of the evidence they have gathered. Instead, they simply withhold belief
in the proposition supported by their evidence until closure of inquiry
reacquires rational status.
26
Although, I should flag that in the end, we actually have six such cases because of the
possibility that someone might not admit the putative defeaters into their noetic state to
begin with.

PERSPECTIVAL SKEPTICAL THEISM

253

But there are other ways of sorting these putative defeaters. For instance, an agent might take the studies to render the evidence gathered
via personal interviews of medical school candidates as merely projective
evidence. Such an individual would understand the empirical studies to
show that in such interviews we see what we want to see rather than what is
actually there. The appropriate response to such information is the same
as the appropriate response to learning that the map one is following to
Old Faithful in Yellowstone National Park is an outdated map with an
incorrectly labeled location for Old Faithful. One would simply throw out
the map in such a situation, and in the case of the interviews, one would
simply throw out the evidence one has gathered about the candidates in
the course of the interviews. And importantly, after one’s evidence has
been fully undermined in this way, one need not reopen inquiry, but rather,
once the change in evidential evaluations has taken place, inquiry can be
closed. In other words, this describes someone who takes the empirical
studies to provide a fully undercutting evidential defeater without also
acquiring a defeater for closure of inquiry.
Yet suppose we have someone who similarly understands the evidence
gathered via personal interviews to be in some important sense projective. However, suppose further that they think this is only partially the
case. Some of the evidence they have gathered, let’s suppose, is not, to
their lights, misleading. Such a person might then recalibrate the degree
of strength accorded the evidence of personal interviews—perhaps only
counting it to a slight degree—without disregarding the evidence in its
entirety. In such a case, then, this person has acquired a partially undercutting evidential defeater.
Might such a person also acquire a closure-of-inquiry defeater? Perhaps. Whether or not they would acquire such a defeater, for instance,
might depend on how epistemically cautious they are. Or rather, it might
depend on the makeup of their epistemic risk profile. Consider the following case from Thomas Kelly that illustrates this point well:
Suppose that the evidence available to me is just barely sufficient to justify my belief that it will rain tomorrow: if the evidence was even slightly
weaker than it is, then I would be unjustified in thinking that it will rain.
Suppose further that you have the same evidence but are slightly more
cautious than I am, and so do not yet believe that it will rain tomorrow. It is
not that you are dogmatically averse to concluding that it will rain; indeed,
we can suppose that if the evidence for rain gets even slightly stronger,
then you too will take up the relevant belief. Is there some guarantee, given
what has been said so far, that you are being less reasonable than I am?—I
doubt it.27

In our case, take two individuals, Judah and Peri, who respond to the
empirical studies by recalibrating the degree of strength they accord to the
27
Kelly, “Peer Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” 120n9 (quoted in Kvanvig,
Rationality and Reflection, 140, to illustrate a similar point concerning rationality).
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evidence of the interviews in precisely the same way. However, suppose
that Judah is slightly more cautious than Peri, and as a result of recalibrating his assessment of the evidence’s strength decides to reopen inquiry
concerning the identity of the best medical school candidate. Peri, however, still finds the evidence sufficiently compelling after recalibration to
conclude that Polly is the best candidate. In this instance, then, Peri has
only acquired a partially undercutting evidential defeater while Judah has
acquired in addition a defeater for closure of inquiry.
So, it is not too difficult to imagine how someone might reasonably acquire a partially undercutting evidential defeater alongside a
closure-of-inquiry defeater. But might someone who has a fully undercutting evidential defeater also acquire a closure-of-inquiry defeater?
This combination could be reasonable as well. Suppose that you acquire
a fully undercutting evidential defeater as described earlier, but further
suppose that you exhibit some doubt about your belief that the evidence
gathered during the personal interviews was actually projective. Indeed,
you think that the prospect of gathering more evidence about the empirical
studies themselves might reasonably lead to a defeater-defeater. That is, you
think further evidence gathering might provide evidence which would
undermine the trustworthiness of the empirical studies and further cancel
out the evidential defeater you have acquired from those studies. In such
a case, learning of the studies undermines the evidence you have gathered via personal interviews, but it also provides a reason to reopen an
investigation concerning the best way to proceed in gathering evidence.
Thus, it seems possible, though admittedly unlikely, that someone might
rationally acquire both a fully undercutting evidential defeater and a closure-of-inquiry defeater on the basis of these interviews. This concludes
our survey of the different rational reactions one might have to learning of
the contents of these empirical studies.
What I have just done, then, is provide six different cases of individuals
faced with putative evidential and closure-of-inquiry defeaters. Each case
was described differently to illustrate how differences in one’s epistemic
machinery (e.g., epistemic risk profile, degree of self-trust, etc.) make
possible different rational reactions to the same putative defeaters. Those
different reactions included (1) denying admission to either defeater full
stop, or acquiring one of (2) a partially undercutting evidential defeater, (3)
a fully undercutting evidential defeater, (4) a closure-of-inquiry defeater,
(5) both a partially undercutting evidential defeater and a closure-of-inquiry defeater, or (6) both a fully undercutting evidential defeater and a
closure-of-inquiry defeater.28
In the next section, we apply what we have learned to the question of
skeptical theism. As becomes clear, changes to one’s theory of epistemic
28
Lest a reader object to this presentation of six options with a worry of the form, “What
about option x?,”for the purposes of this essay I am not committing to any claim that the six
options given are exhaustive of the possibilities.
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defeat, including but not limited to the addition of closure-of-inquiry defeaters, have significant implications for the merits of skeptical theism as
a response to the argument of evil. We shall see, in fact, that there is a
plurality of reasonable responses to skeptical theism, all of which depend
on the epistemic character of the agent assessing the evidence of suffering.
4. Perspectival Skeptical Theism:
Rational Optionality and Epistemic Defeat in the Face of Evil
It is now time to apply the distinction between evidential and closure-of-inquiry defeaters, along with what we have gleaned from the various ways
in which such defeaters might be resolved, to the case of skeptical theism
and the argument from suffering. Recall the original statement of skeptical theism from § 1:
Skeptical Theism (ST): human agents simply are not in a position to determine how likely or unlikely it is that a given instance of apparently
gratuitous evil is actually gratuitous.
There are, it seems to me, two different putative defeaters that skeptical
theism might generate for a given agent who is entertaining ST. This is due
to the fact that there are two different ways to explain why human agents
are unreliable in the way ST suggests. First, an agent might think that ST
calls into question the quality of the evidence for gratuitous suffering of which
she is in possession.29 Second, however, an agent might alternatively think
that ST undermines her reliability in assessing the evidence she has. In other
words, skeptical theism, like the earlier case involving the interviewing
of medical school candidates, includes the potential for two different undercutting defeaters: one aptly described as evidential and the other as
closure-of-inquiry.
So, the case of ST parallels the medical school candidate interviews
case, and the parallels are these: (a) both cases concern the gathering
and assessment of evidence in a particular domain, and (b) both cases
threaten either an evidential defeater (with, presumably, either partial
or full defeating power) or a closure-of-inquiry defeater. Moreover, the
variables involved in determining the possible rational responses to the
putative defeaters involved in the medical school interviews case were
not variables specific to that case. Rather, they were variables that could
in principle apply to any parallel instance of epistemic defeat. But the case
of ST is a parallel instance of such epistemic defeat. Thus, the six rational

29
It is worth keeping in mind that, with respect to our agent’s evidence gathering practices, she might not be doing anything epistemically wrong in gathering evidence. She might
simply be stuck in a situation with respect to the evidence of gratuitous suffering analogous
to the situation facing the denizens of evil demon worlds. That is, she might gather evidence
perfectly well. The problem will merely lie in the fact that all the evidence she responsibly
gathers is fundamentally misleading. That is, in such situations it is the evidence that is the
problem rather than the agent.
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reactions to the putative defeaters found in the medical school interviews
case should also be found in the case of ST.
What do we get when we consider the six different types of rational
reactions involved in the case of ST? We again have the following possibilities: (1) denying admission to ST as a defeater full stop or acquiring ST as
one of the following—(2) a partially undercutting evidential defeater, (3)
a fully undercutting evidential defeater, (4) a closure-of-inquiry defeater,
(5) both a partially undercutting evidential defeater and a closure-of-inquiry defeater, or (6) both a fully undercutting evidential defeater and a
closure-of-inquiry defeater.
Let us consider the upshot of this theory of defeat, then, for ST. According to option 1, it can be rational for someone to dismiss ST entirely.
That is, in some cases, this employment of ST allows that someone can
rationally endorse premise 2 of the argument from suffering after entertaining the possibility of ST (i.e., as in option 1). However, this employment
of ST also allows that someone might be forced, on pain of irrationality,
to entirely withdraw belief in premise 2 (i.e., as in options 3, 4, 5, and
6). This is true of the final three options because of the presence of closure-of-inquiry defeat, which prohibits reasonable belief even in the face
of very strong evidence. Furthermore, this is true in the case of option 3
in virtue of the fact that one’s seemings as of gratuitous suffering are (or, at
least, very likely are) the most significant source of evidence that there is
gratuitous suffering. It follows from this that if that evidence is fully undermined and we assume that no other source of such evidence is in play,
then one will possess no evidence in favor of the existence of gratuitous
suffering.30 Thus, it seems quite unlikely that someone finding themselves
characterized by option 3 would be in an epistemically favorable position
with respect to affirming that gratuitous suffering exists. When it comes to
option 2, whether or not an agent remains on-balance justified in affirming
that gratuitous suffering exists (i.e., after entertaining and resolving ST as
a partially undercutting evidential defeater) depends on the degree of recalibration required by that agent’s noetic system and the other epistemic
standards by which she can be represented (e.g., epistemic risk profile,
epistemic self-trust, etc.). Such an agent might be rational in retaining a
belief that gratuitous suffering exists (i.e., a belief in premise 2), but to
know whether this is the case requires us to know more about that agent.
In other words, mere knowledge of the propositions composing that
agent’s evidence will be insufficient to further know whether that agent is
justified in affirming that gratuitous suffering exists.

30
Of course, one might, for instance, have a friend who is one’s epistemic superior and is
also supremely trustworthy. Perhaps that friend also finds the evidential argument from evil
compelling and provides testimonial evidence. In that case, the particular evidential support
relation targeted by ST would not affect all the relevant evidence since some of the relevant
evidence is testimonial (i.e., not gathered from attending to one’s seemings). I bracket out this
and similar sources of evidence in subsequent discussion.
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5. Reflection on the Benefits of Perspectival Skeptical Theism
The preceding story concerning how the epistemic defeater(s) involved in
ST might rationally play out partly constitutes what I have been calling
perspectival skeptical theism. Endorsing such a view of epistemic rationality, however, is not itself sufficient to be a perspectival skeptical theist,
for endorsing that view of defeat is compatible with also thinking that ST
never serves as a defeater for anyone. It would indeed be an odd form
of skeptical theism that denied ST defeated anything. Thus, in addition,
perspectival skeptical theism affirms that when it comes to cases that are
rightly characterized by the no defeat option (i.e., where the agent under
consideration does not acquire a defeater when reflecting on ST), the
agents involved likely suffer from a form of epistemic deficiency different
from the egocentric rationality of particular concern to perspectivalists.31
Perhaps such agents possess undue intellectual arrogance or perhaps they
are motivated by something other than truth. The reason for the epistemic
deficiency would vary from case to case, but the fundamental point of the
perspectival skeptical theist would be that (i) there are multiple dimensions of epistemic evaluation of which egocentric rationality is but one
(though by no means an unimportant one), and (ii) in no-defeat cases of
agents entertaining ST, rationality in a broader sense than the egocentric
one has been undermined on some epistemically relevant basis.
Before concluding, it is worth briefly reflecting on why someone
might be inclined to adopt perspectival skeptical theism over the more
traditional variants of skeptical theism. Consider the following from
a hypothetical objector. “So the idea of perspectival skeptical theism is
that there is this special type of defeater, a closure-of-inquiry defeater,
that someone might acquire for the proposition that there are gratuitous
evils. Why might someone acquire this defeater? Well, they might do so
in virtue of the sorts of considerations routinely given in support of ST
(e.g., non-representativeness of evidence, analogical reasoning, etc.). In
that case, then, what’s so remarkable about this special closure-of-inquiry
defeater? The answer seems to be that closure-of-inquiry defeaters, once
acquired, prevent an agent from reasonably believing the proposition in
question even if the evidential support of that proposition has not been
undercut by the defeater. Indeed, even if the degree of evidential support
is very high between the agent’s evidence and target proposition, reasonable belief is still undermined. If this is right (and it is), then here’s my
worry: this is a strange version of ST because it seems to imply that the
atheist wins the day. Evidential arguments from suffering typically only
aim to establish that atheism is probable. But perspectival skeptical theism
31
I say “likely” since the conceptual space will remain, for a consistent perspectivalist,
involving someone who scores well on all dimensions of epistemic rationality (i.e., they have
a reasonable degree of intellectual virtue, are motivated by truth and not wish-fulfillment or
something similar, etc.) but is in the unfortunate situation of just being wrong. Such a situation is analogous to an evil demon case where epistemic justification suffers a disconnect
from alethic justification.
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seems to imply that even if ST is true, atheism may remain probable! As
a result, closure-of-inquiry defeat seems to add little or no support to the
skeptical theist’s aims.”32
There are several things to say in response to this objection. First, the last
sentence of the objection presupposes that skeptical theists have some sort
of common goal. Perhaps this type of objector assumes that all skeptical
theists are theists (a reasonable mistake given the misleading name with
which the position has been christened).33 If that were true, then perhaps
the common goal of all skeptical theists could reasonably be identified as
the apologetic task of defending theism against all possibility of attack.
But this goal is not my goal. I am interested in the argument and a proper
understanding of the mechanics of epistemic defeat involved when assessing the argument from the first-person perspective. Thus, if the
perspectivalist construal of epistemic defeat is correct and if the objector
is right that perspectival skeptical theism allows atheism to win the day,
then I am satisfied. For in that scenario, we have a better understanding
of the argument as well as the proper place for ST (i.e., even if theism is
undermined).
Even so, is it really correct to characterize someone in possession of a
closure-of-inquiry defeater as “winning the day,” even if their evidence
continues to support some target proposition (e.g., that there are gratuitous evils)? Perspectival skeptical theism contends that in addition to
sufficient supporting evidence for a proposition, someone can “win the
day” only if their evidence is not undermined by a closure-of-inquiry
defeater which calls into question the reliability of that evidence or the
agent’s evaluation of the evidence. To say that someone in this situation
has “won the day” seems odd, to say the least. Witness the following sorts
of bizarre conclusions as parodies of this sort of objection:
Pink elephants probably exist. I see them everywhere! Granted, I took
a hallucinogen this morning, so my evidence is probably systemically
misleading. Nevertheless, I am glad to know my argument from I see
a bunch of pink elephants to the claim that they probably exist is supported by my evidence.
Polly is probably the best medical school candidate. After all, she
nailed the personal interview! Now, I know that those empirical studies
strongly undermine the reliability of my intuitions based on that interview, so I won’t conclude that Polly is the best candidate. In fact,
it would be an epistemic mistake. That is, it would be unreasonable.
Nevertheless, I am glad to know that she is probably the best candidate
based on my (probably unreliable) evidence.
32
I owe this objection to an anonymous referee. Indeed, I have met this objection independently on a number of occasions, which is why I am addressing it in the main text.
33
The unfortunate-naming observation of skeptical theism has been made by others. See,
for instance, Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Epistemic Humility, Arguments from Evil, and Moral
Skepticism,” 17–18.
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Is Alex guilty of murder? Well, all the evidence seems to point that way,
so he’s probably guilty. Of course, Alex’s defense attorney made a pretty
strong case that Alex had been framed, in which case the evidence
strongly supports his guilt in a fundamentally misleading way. But at
least we know he’s guilty on the basis of this potentially misleading
evidence. Perhaps that’s all we on the jury should care about.
Suppose that the above examples characterize the epistemic situation
of someone assessing the merit of the argument from suffering. If so, then
I contend that they have further work to do. For the fact that atheism is
probable on their evidence doesn’t seem significant enough to render
“winning the day” an apt description of them. Or to put it another way,
“winning the day” is an apt description of them only if it is also an apt
description of the three agents described in the three above examples. Unfortunately for the objector, it’s clearly not.
Having set aside the above objection, then, are there any positive reasons for endorsing perspectival skeptical theism? That is, does it have any
significant advantages over other forms of ST?
Indeed, there are several advantages. First, philosophers residing on
both sides of the theistic/atheistic divide understand the strong inclination
to believe both of the following propositions; namely, (i) that events like
the Holocaust very strongly seem to include gratuitous suffering and (ii)
human agents are not reliably able to track all the possible goods, evils, and
entailment relations between them, the tracking of which is needed to determine whether an evil is gratuitous.34 Any account of rationality should,
I think, be able to explain the intuitive pull of these propositions while
also allowing that an agent might reject one or the other intuition without
giving up their claim to rationality. That is, a strong intuition in support of
epistemic permissivism35 characterizes this debate, and perspectival skeptical theism provides the epistemic foundations for preserving it.
Second, although perspectival skeptical theism allows that someone
might be reflectively rational in dismissing ST as a defeater in its entirety—
and thereby leaves the argument from suffering rationally compelling for
at least some possible agents—it also makes affirming the argument from
suffering more difficult. Many philosophers either explicitly or implicitly
betray a tendency to assume that the weighing of evidence is all that fundamentally matters when assessing the argument from suffering,36 but the
perspectival skeptical theist points out that often other epistemic factors
34
This is akin to the construal of skeptical theism found in Michael Bergmann’s version
of skeptical theism. See, for instance, Bergmann, “Commonsense Sceptical Theism,” 11–12.
35
For an excellent and brief recent discussion of permissivism, see Kelly, “Evidence Can
Be Permissive.”
36
See for instance, Matheson, “Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism”;
Dougherty, “Phenomenal Conservatism, Skeptical Theism, and Probabilistic Reasoning”;
Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering,” 148; van
Inwagen, “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,” 163, 171;
and Bergmann, “Commonsense Scepticism Theism,” 23–24.
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are relevant (e.g., epistemic risk profiles, degrees of epistemic self-trust,
etc.) to an assessment of the argument. It follows from these considerations
that even if one determines that the evidence in one’s possession strongly
confirms that gratuitous suffering exists, one may yet remain unable to
reasonably believe the proposition confirmed by one’s evidence. That is,
until one has gathered sufficient evidence and garnered a sufficient degree
of epistemic self-trust to render closure of inquiry appropriate,37 belief that
there are gratuitous evils will remain rationally inappropriate.
Third, ST has in various places been saddled with concerns that employing skepticism as a response to the argument from suffering precludes
the further employment of defenses or theodicies in response to the same
argument. Because it includes the possibility of closure-of-inquiry defeat,
however, perspectival skeptical theism offers an interesting way out of
these concerns.38
Suppose that someone, Sandy, acquires a closure-of-inquiry defeater
in virtue of having a particular degree of epistemic risk aversion. That is,
suppose that Sandy, as a matter of policy when considering subjects insufficiently relevant to everyday life, refuses to affirm a proposition unless
she assigns a credence of at least .95 to the proposition. Let the proposition
in question be there are gratuitous evils. Prior to considering theodical arguments, Sandy assigns a credence of .96 to there are gratuitous evils. Because
of her policy of affirming propositions with a credence of at least .95, she
affirms there are gratuitous evils. Suppose she then considers the free-will
defense for the first time, and it seems to her that the probability of there
are gratuitous evils given her assessment of the free-will defense becomes
.94. As a result of considering the free-will defense, the credence she assigns to the proposition that there are gratuitous evils has fallen below the
egocentrically-determined threshold for reasonable belief. As a result, she
acquires a closure-of-inquiry defeater for the reliability of her evidence
that there are gratuitous evils in a way that is perfectly consistent with
considering the impact of defenses and theodicies on the evidence of suffering in her possession.39
There are other measures by which a philosophical position might be
evaluated. Accordingly, I do not intend to claim that the three advantages
cited above decisively favor perspectival skeptical theism over its more
traditional rivals. Nevertheless, the advantages cited—i.e., its fit with epistemic permissivism, additional requirements for endorsing the argument
37
Rutledge, “Commonsense, Skeptical Theism, and Different Sorts of Closure of Inquiry
Defeat,” 25–30.
38
See also Michael Murray, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, 37–40 for a way of thinking about
how traditional forms of ST might allow for considering the merits of theodicies or defenses.
39
Similar points could be made to explain how the employment of natural theology might
be compatible with perspectivalist forms of ST. See, for instance, Wilks, who articulates the
worry that ST and natural theology do not fit well together: “The [skeptical theist] rationale
that discounts the problem of evil should be applied with equal force to any form of the design argument which appeals to the presence of goods” (“The Global Skepticism Objection
to Skeptical Theism,” 460).
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from suffering, and compatibility with assessing the strength of various
theodicies—offer a significant change to the thrust of the debate and can
refocus the discussion of skeptical theism on epistemic foundations which
too often go critically unexamined.
Conclusion
In this article, I constructed a new form of skeptical theism, perspectival
skeptical theism, modeled as a combination of a standard skeptical theist’s thesis, ST, with a perspectivalist form of epistemic rationality and
defeat. After distinguishing between evidential and closure-of-inquiry
defeaters, I considered how such defeaters might differently interact with
epistemically varied agents. I identified six possible rational outcomes
of agents faced with putative epistemic undercutting defeat spawning
from the results of a study conducted on the trustworthiness of medical
school interviews as sources of evidence for the best future medical school
students. Next, I showed how the defeaters emerging from the medical
school case could be seen as parallel to the defeaters involved in an agent’s
entertaining of ST. By drawing out the parallels, I arrived at a description
of perspectival skeptical theism and briefly reflected on its advantages
over alternative interpretations of the epistemic implications of ST. Those
advantages, though not alone decisive, demonstrate that perspectival
skeptical theism both holds much promise as a way of progressing the
quality of debate surrounding the argument from suffering and deserves
more attention moving forward.40
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